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REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH 
The Cosmology of Law in Buddhist Tibet 
In an effort to think anew about the relationship between secular law 
and Buddhist law, as well as the relationship between traditional and 
modern concepts of civic religion, this paper will present secular 
Tibetan law as it existed during the reign of the Dalai Lamas in Bud-
dhist Tibet. My first goal will be to discuss briefly the organization 
and administration of the Tibetan secular legal system, the roles of 
officials and legal representatives, some jurisprudential concepts and 
the law codes.' 
A second focus will be to reorient our understanding of Buddhist 
law toward a more interpretive and actor-centered framework. I will 
begin by presenting a legal case, narrated by a Tibetan, which took 
place in Lhasa in the 1940s and will be presented in two parts. Each 
part will be followed by an exegesis of the questions I found myself 
asking as it was recounted, questions which came from my own pre -
sumptions and preconceptions as an American attorney with training 
in anthropology. Each of the answers to these questions builds part of 
the hemispheric cultural backdrop in which this Tibetan narrator oper-
ated as a legal actor — his use of myths, relations of power, concepts 
of time, space and personal identity, the legal rituals, history, religious 
principles, reasoning patterns, procedures, available roles, symbols—in 
short, a backdrop which I call the Cosmology of Law. It is my view 
that for each case at law, a participant draws from this Cosmology of 
Law, these particular shared categories, social practices and social 
concepts, and foregrounds them into presentations for a particu lar set 
of circumstances. It is possible for us to work back from these actual 
instantiations of particular cases to sketch out the cosmological 
1. A version of this article was presented at the Numata Conference on 
Religion and Law at the University of Chicago in March, 1994. I would like 
to thank Pierre Schlag and Kristen Van Ausdall for their comments on this 
paper. This paper is dedicated to my daughter, Emilie Redwood Hess. 
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hemisphere from which elements are being drawn and this exercise in 
construction from the particular constitutes a new interpretive approach 
to Buddhist and secular law. 
My third endeavour will be to question the ways in which we are 
constructing our categories of meaning in this inquiry, in particular the 
terms "religion," "Buddhism," "secular law," and "religious law." In 
an attempt to reconsider and unpack the modern connotations of these 
terms, I think that we will find layers of epistemological (indeed, even 
ontological) assumptions about the nature of our inquiry which will 
help us to reflect on, and perhaps introduce new questions into, our 
exegetical and theoretical enterprise. 
I would like to begin with a story taken from the verbatim taped tran-
script of a Tibetan layman who worked as a kha mchu len pa or legal 
representative in the capital city of Lhasa in the 1940s. Kungo 
Tsewang Tamdin is a very knowledgable man who handled cases in 
the Lhasa government courts for the state of Sakya as well as for pri -
vate clients. The conversations between Kungola Tsewang Tamdin 
and I spanned several years in the mid 1980s. We met in his three 
room cement apartment in Dharamsala, India and talked over continu-
ous cups of Tibetan tea prof erred by his manservant. While I inter-
viewed over two hundred Tibetans in depth during this period, 
Tsewang Tamdin remains fixed in my memory as particularly percep-
tive, capable of the most detailed renderings of the minute circum-
stances of cases in court in Lhasa. Here is a short excerpt from his 
story: 
Every year in the same month, almost a thousand [sa skya] monks traveled 
west from their home monastery in khams [in eastern Tibet] to ngor 
monastery in central Tibet to receive teachings from the sa skya [high 
lamas]. When they came this long distance, they begged food and clothing 
along the way from the people in the districts. 
One year I learned that a man and his friends had become very angry with 
[a large group of] monks [for their insistent begging] and after a fight, had 
killed two of them. This was a very terrible happening and became a well-
known event in the entire area. 
Now, the person who had killed the monks was a member of the Tibetan 
army and so the local community [where the incident occurred] sent a peti-
tion to the Tibetan Cabinet [in the government in Lhasa]. The case was sent 
by the Cabinet to the Office of the Army [in Lhasa]. So the man [who had 
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done the killing] was brought to that office in Lhasa and he was whipped 
with the "initial whip" by the guards of that office. 
Then two women who had known the murdered sa skya monks well and 
were from their home village [in Khams in eastern Tibet] came to see me 
[at home] and asked that I would go into court for them. I said that I had 
nothing to appeal to the court for. They asked me to appeal to the court for 
the stong payment. For one ordinary monk, [they said] the payment is 9 
rdo tshad, so for two monks it was 18 rdo tshad. [They said that] if the 
monks had robbed or fought [prior to the murders], then the amount of the 
stong payment would be reduced. So, in response to the request of these 
women, I said that 1 would petition to the court office for them. 
So, I went to the office to the west of the city and found that there were 
two very important Tibetan officials acting as judges in this case. One was 
of the Cabinet Minister rank and the other was of the next lower rank. 
Instead of carrying a written petition with me, I just went to the office and 
made the request orally. After presenting the entire oral petition, the judges 
told me they would consider the claim of the women and said that I should 
return when [all of the issues of] the case [had been] decided. 
This is the first half of this simple case. The ways in which actors 
fashion their own intersubjective meanings and narratives represents 
the heart of legal practice in this Buddhist society. And yet the 
meanings which Tsewang Tamdin fashions through this story are hid-
den from us as readers. As readers, much of what we understand about 
this case is through projections about our own legal system which 
may indeed be misunderstandings of his legal system. So in order to 
approximate what he is representing, we need to know a number of 
things about the Tibetan milieu as he perceived them, such as: how 
the monks and army officers were viewed in the society; when and 
how and for whom Tsewang Tamdin could intercede; the complexities 
of ritual and procedure he articulated; the meaning of the word stong; 
who signed a document and where; and what language codes were used 
in each particular setting. 
We will investigate in the next section just what those meanings and 
understandings were for Tsewang Tamdin, and find perhaps that many 
of our presumptions were misdirected. This exegesis of the Legal 
Cosmology of this "Case of the Murdered Monks" will include the 
following sections: (1) The Nature of Reality and Illusion, Cosmos 
and Time; (2) The Mandala of the Law including Institutions, Space 
and Legal Units; (3) Moral Narratives and Myths; (4) Jurisprudence of 
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the Mind; (5) The Rituals of the Golden Yoke including Language and 
Roles; and (6) The Grammar of the Law. 
The Nature of Reality and Illusion, the Cosmos and Time 
Tsewang Tamdin commented to me several times in reference to this 
case, that because the Tibetan legal system acknowledged the Buddhist 
threefold nature of reality, he was prepared for arguments shifting the 
reality/illusion frame of this incident from the appearance level of 
reality, the parikalpita in Sanskrit (kun brtagspa'i in Tibetan), to the 
relative or paritantra level (gshan gyi dbang) or to the final, perfected 
level of reality, the parinispanna (yons su grub pa). When questioned 
as to what this meant, he responded that he was poised to find out that 
the facts as represented were not the real facts, that is, to find out that 
one or either of the monks were actually tulkus (sprul sku), reincarna-
tions of their predecessors, or high level tantric masters which would 
have significantly changed their social value and the meaning of their 
acts. He would not have been surprised to have been told that the 
army officer was not what he appeared to be, i. e. that he had some 
other religious identity. Arguments might be made that this incident 
was a karmic necessity to burn off the bad seeds of the monks. It 
might be rationalized due to some previous karmic relation between 
the parties. He said that parties had argued that a death was not a 
death at all but a transmission of life to another being staged as a 
death. While doubting that these arguments would influence the 
judges in a murder case, Tibetan legal representatives had to be pre-
pared for several possible reality shifts that foregrounded the Buddhist 
notion of the illusory nature of this worldy life and the ultimate reality 
of perfected vision. 
The temporal dimensions of this case also markedly determined our 
narrator's approaches and responses. Fine distinctions made on the 
basis of the dates of particular statutory changes, so common in west-
ern law, are not strongly at issue here. We are not told in the story 
how long after the murder the case was reported or how long after that 
the defendant spent in confinement, or even which statute applied 
because of when it took place. There is a timelessness, a kind of 
atemporality, in this story and Tibetan law which is very distinctive 
and related to the everpresentness of different realities and cosmic 
realms. 
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The Mandala of the Law 
including Institutions, Space and Legal Units 
How did Tsewang Tamdin understand the relationship between the site 
of the case and the central city courts? What were the spatial and tem-
poral components of these relations? Tsewang related these ideas to 
me, as many Tibetans had, using the root metaphor for the Tibetan 
cosmos, a dkyil 'khor or mandala pattern. The Tibetan mandala pre-
sents the entire universe and all realms within a single essential plan, 
representing at one and the same time the constancy of movement 
in/out, up/down, the cyclical nature of rebirth, reified social and spatial 
hierarchy, the universalized path of individual mental conscience and 
the ultimate union of the sacred and the secular in a single cosmic 
design. The mandala is also the root metaphor for the levels of the 
legal administration in ever decreasing circles, from the outerlying 
districts of the plateau, to the district headquarters, to the governors' 
offices, to the Cabinet in the capital city and, ultimately, to the central 
godhead of the Dalai Lama. This form was repeated in Lhasa, for the 
central administration building in the capital which contained the High 
Court was built around a core building which housed the Jowo, the 
most sacred statue of the Sakyamuni Buddha in Tibet. Thus, mapping 
the legal system of Tibet in mandala form both integrated law into 
this pervasive religious schema and legitimized it with a symbol of 
cosmic integration. 
Why were the deaths of these two monks being handled not in eccle -
siastical but in governmental courts? Monastic institutions and 
monastic landholdings were extensive in Tibet and sects such as the 
Sakya often held plots of land throughout the entire plateau in addition 
to their large central Vatican-like state within the domain of the central 
provinces. These sectarian holdings both divided the country into 
separate doctrinal groups and united it with constant exchanges and 
relationships between the farflung monastic units such as the annual 
pilgrimage by the monks in this case. Monastic institutions had their 
own court processes following the Vinaya. Appeal was available 
through the ecclesiastical administration to the High Ecclesiastical 
Office in the Potala and, ultimately, to the Dalai Lama. Murder and a 
few other serious offenses committed by monks resulted in their 
expulsion from the monastic community and their treatment in the 
secular courts. In Tibet, the occupation of the defendant in a murder 
case determined the venue of the trial. In this instance, the crime was 
committed by a member of the Army. The local people were respon-
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sible for reporting the murder to the Cabinet in Lhasa which then 
assigned it to the Office of the Army. The new Army, organized in 
the twentieth century after prodding by the British, held an ambiguous 
position in Tibetan society with its traditional rejection of war. For 
this reason, the offices of the Army were located outside of the city 
and the central mandala of power. Tsewang Tamdin tells us that he 
"went to the office to the west of the city . . ." 
How does the Tibetan secular court system with its multiple levels 
of court-offices and standardized process of appeal compare to the 
hierarchical layering of legal institutions in the west? There are few 
similarities between the two systems. For example, most cases in 
Tibet could be started at any level including the Cabinet and this was 
not true only for elite petitioners. At each level, there were several dif-
ferent types of procedures and a variety of forums for a plaintiff to 
approach. Petitioners had to reach consensus with the other party and 
with the adjudicators in that forum before a suit was joined, or taken 
up by the forum. Suits could travel up and down in the system, that 
is, they could go to the local headman, then to the Cabinet in official 
government procedure, then out to conciliation with a lama, then 
down to a steward in a regional estate for decision, then back to the 
Cabinet for closure. Even when the Cabinet accepted a case that the 
parties had agreed to, the suit did not go forward without their consent 
and one of the parties could then start proceedings elsewhere. 
Added to this were several other ideas such as the concept of "non-
decay" (that suits did not become old with the passage of time), the 
lack of exclusive jurisdiction for courts and the notion that courts were 
generally not legal level specific, legal procedure specific or legal sub-
ject matter specific. Thus a minor secular family dispute could be 
brought to the High Ecclesiastical Court in the Potala by a family 
member of one of the clerks just as it could be brought to that fami-
lies' neighborhood watchman in Lhasa. Flexibility, non-decay, over-
lapping jurisdiction, consensus to forums and procedures are among 
the many elements which make the Tibetan legal system dissimilar 
from our own and which made navigation through its channels so 
interesting. Crimes of murder, as in this case, were the exception; they 
were routinely sent up through official channels to the Cabinet in 
Lhasa and then referred out for trial at the appropriate upper level 
court, here the Office of the Army outside the city. However, even in 
murder cases, the forum could be contested and the court could not 
proceed without the appearance and participation of all parties to the 
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case. Tsewang Tamdin mentioned to me that, if they had refused to 
recognize his claim to the payments, he would have objected to the 
venue. 
Why is it that two unrelated women from a village of the victims 
could intrude into this legal process? Tibetan legal units were concep-
tualized rather broadly. The category of persons who could make 
claims for payments for compensation or reharmonization in post-trial 
rituals was large in Tibet as was the group of persons who might be 
potentially responsible for such payments. An individual murderer 
was not protected from the process by his presence in a larger category 
of army personnel just as a member of a corporate business unit could 
not be shielded from individual liability. These aspects of the legal 
system connote very different concepts of social units, social responsi-
blity and individual identity. 
Moral Narratives and Myths 
What did the narrator see as the relationship between Buddhism and a 
secular legal system? On the one hand, Tsewang Tamdin presented no 
clear division between the religious and political realms or between 
administration and law in his conversations. Indeed, he presented 
inviolable connections such as the fusion of the Buddha in the form of 
the Dalai Lama with the state and the Buddhist religion. The overarch-
ing picture is one of a unified cosmos represented by the mandalic 
form of a government centered in the Buddha. On the other hand, he 
clearly differentiated between tshul khrims, moral law from the Vinaya 
(which outlined the Buddha's rules and procedures for the monastery) 
and rgyal khrims, state law as described in the khrims yig zhal Ice (the 
law codes of the secular government for use in the government courts). 
Thus, he saw them simultaneously as one and the same, and as 
entirely distinct. 
When I asked Kungo Tamdin about the moral dimensions of this 
case, he responded in several ways. First, he said, murder was the 
most important of the Ten Non-Virtuous Acts and particularly conse-
quential to one's karmic position when done in anger as here. Second, 
he stated that it was essential to make particular normative arguments 
in court. In this case, for example, he had to argue that the two female 
petitioners were aware of the need to beneficially influence the future 
lives of the dead monks by performing the correct religious rituals and 
that this was their purpose in obtaining the money. Third, it was pre-
sumed that the judge officiating was considering the future life of the 
104 JIABS 18.1 
defendant when sanctioning. Indeed, in other cases like this one, the 
amputation of limbs or severing of tendons of the defendant was con-
strued by the judges as the best punishment because it promoted 
prayer in this life by eliminating all occupations except that of a 
prayer-wheel spinning mendicant. Fourth, for Tsewang Tamdin and 
the other parties to this case, the Buddha stood as an ideal standard, a 
constant reference point for right ways of action in the court. So, 
though the Case of the Murdered Monks involved little moralizing as 
rendered, it was played out against a resonant moral background 
understood by all the participants. 
While never mentioned, ancient Tibetan myths and stories played a 
key subtextual role in this case influencing the decision of the judges 
and the roles of the parties. It mattered greatly, our narrator related, 
that the monks were from the land of ge sar. Now what does this 
mean? Eastern Tibet in general was reknowned as the land of ge sar 
of gling, the epic king turned warrior god of Tibetan mythology. The 
khamspa, the term for people from a large area in eastern Tibet, have 
pon or chiefs who claim descent from ge sar's half-brother. Lhasa res-
idents consider them to be extraordinary horsemen and swaggerers 
with rough and crude manners who pick fights that result in physical 
violence. These characteristics are both mocked and admired by the 
central Tibetans for they represent the haughty freedom of the nomadic 
pastoralists as well as the tribal lives of the revered original Tibetan 
kings who were only modestly pacified by Buddhism. Thus it 
becomes important that the monks who were killed in the story were 
khams pa, reknowned for their bellicose personalities and that they 
were killed by a member of the new Army, formed recently and hardly 
considered an effective fighting force in the country. 
Given the moral pollution of murdering two monks, why were very 
religious lay people, such as the narrator and two women, involving 
themselves in this case? While the relationship of the lay population 
to the monastic population in Tibet is a thoroughly Buddhist division 
between spiritual supporters and spiritual seekers, the monastic popu-
lation was so large that it often, especially on pilgrimage as in this 
case, presented the local population with an excessive burden of volun -
tary provisioning. Thus, while this incident was infamous, it was not 
surprising to Tibetans and did not cause our narrator to refuse the case, 
nor the women to refuse the payments. 
FRENCH 105 
The Jurisprudence of the Mind 
When I asked Tsewang Tamdin about the repertoire of concepts he 
used to frame his arguments in court that first day, he began with the 
caveat that Tibet had no legal concepts per se, only concepts from the 
Buddha. That said, he moved on in the course of our interviews to a 
variety of jurisprudential concepts pertinent in this case such as the 
process of factoring by which all acts including murder were assessed 
with respect to—the object, the motivation, the act and the completion 
of the act. A mental consciencey particularly one that recognized right 
conduct and moral self-regulation (rang khrims) was viewed as the 
foundation of a moral society. Mental conscience was an essential 
characteristic to be established for any witness or party. Persons with 
moral self-regulation were not, in the words of the law codes, "acting 
for their own benefit"; they spoke honestly, they worked to reharmo-
nize themselves and the community and they acted responsibly con-
sidering their household or community. 
A third point in this case was that citation to precedent carried abso-
lutely no weight in Tibetan courts, stare decisis (the doctrine that a 
court will stick with precedent) as well as res judicata (the doctrine 
that a final decision by a court is a bar to subsequent action) did not 
pertain. Most cases in Tibet, Tsewang Tamdin explained, could be 
continually reopened, a feature he and others lauded. Individuals and 
circumstances were presumed to be radically unique, that is, not com-
parable to other persons or circumstances regardless of how apparently 
similar they were. Therefore, as a legal representative, he went into 
court without recourse to layers of previous interpretations. References 
at trial were made primarily to standards in the law codes and to fac -
toring of the circumstances on the basis of the Buddhist principles. 
Many other jurisprudential notions such as proof, and root and imme-
diate causation, while they are not highlighted in this case, were also 
part of this narrator's legal conceptual repertoire. 
Feeling rather more situated within the Tibetan context, we return to 
the Case of the Murdered Monks to listen once again to Tsewang 
Tamdin, from the beginning to the conclusion of his story: 
Every year in the same month, almost a thousand [sa skya] monks traveled 
west from their home monastery in khams [in eastern Tibet] to ngor 
monastery in central Tibet to receive teachings from the sa skya [high 
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lamas]. When they came this long distance, they begged food and clothing 
along the way from the people in the districts. 
One year I learned that a man and his friends had become very angry with 
[a large group of] monks [for their insistent begging] and after a fight, had 
killed two of them. This was a very terrible happening and became a well-
known event in the entire area. 
Now, the person who had killed the monks was a member of the Tibetan 
army and so the local community [where the incident occurred] sent a peti-
tion to the Tibetan Cabinet [in the government in Lhasa]. The case was 
sent by the Cabinet to the Office of the Army [in Lhasa]. So the man [who 
had done the killing] was brought to that office in Lhasa and he was 
whipped with the "initial whip" by the guards of that office. 
Then two women who had known the murdered sa skya monks well and 
were from their home village [in Khams in eastern Tibet] came to see me 
[at home] and asked that I would go into court for them. I said that I had 
nothing to appeal to the court for. They asked me to appeal to the court for 
the stong payment. For one ordinary monk, [they said] the payment is 9 
rdo tshad, so for two monks it was 18 rdo tshad. [They said that] if the 
monks had robbed or fought [prior to the murders], then the amount of the 
stong payment would be reduced. So, in response to the request of these 
women, I said that I would petition to the court office for them. 
So, I went to the office to the west of the city and found that there were 
two very important Tibetan officials acting as judges in this case. One was 
of the Cabinet Minister rank and the other was of the next lower rank. 
Instead of carrying a written petition with me, I just went to the office and 
made the request orally. After presenting the entire oral petition, the judges 
told me they would consider the claim of the women and said that I should 
return when [all of the issues of] the case [had been] decided. 
Then sometime later I was called to the court. The secretary brought the 
final decision document outside and read it in front of the court waiting 
room [to all of the participants]. I was then given a notice to come back 
the day after tomorrow. 
On that day, the secretary of the court again read the decision and 
explained the court costs section and the payment of the stong and all the 
many other payments required. Then the secretary asked all sides of the 
dispute to sign the decision document, including the army man-murderer 
and myself. So, at the bottom of the document, the murderer and I both 
signed and sealed the document. Then the secretary turned to the murderer 
and asked him for the stong payment. 
He offered it and the secretary took the stong payment from the murderer. 
From this payment of 18 rdo tshad, the [Head] secretary then subtracted the 
court costs and the ink fees for the [drafting] secretaries and handed the rest 
to me. There were three copies made of the document and I received one. 
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After that I left, so that I did not find out about the other punishments 
given to the murderer. 
Then I went to see the two women who had asked me to represent them. 
I gave them all of the remaining money and later they used it all for the 
funeral rites and for other religious rituals for the future lives of the monks. 
I then took an account from these women of what they had spent and the 
offerings that they made and sent the receipts for this to their home district. 
Usually, the stong payment goes to the relatives but this time, the only 
people who knew the monks and claimed the payments were these two 
women, so it went to them. That was the end [of it]. 
Once again, I think, we find that more information in the case throws 
us into confusion. Why is the murderer signing the decision docu-
ment? What is the stong and why are all of these payments calculated 
from it? Is this all the punishment that the murderer gets? Here again, 
our assumptions about the nature of the enterprise continue to fill up 
and shape our mental space. Returning to the device of exegetical 
questions, our assumptions can be replaced by an understanding of the 
Tibetan legal practices as Tsewang knew them. 
The Rituals of the Golden Yoke including Language and Roles 
What kinds of ritual processes were available in a case like this? There 
were at least four distinct types of ritualized legal processes in Tibet: 
1. visiting an official at home, 
2. an official court procedure which had over forty-four intricate 
steps, 
3. conciliation which was a distinct area of procedure with its own 
history and vocabulary, and 
4. other less formal rituals such as rolling dice, plunging a hand in 
hot oil or water, visiting an oracle and swearing before a diety. 
When the two women first visited our narrator, they used the first 
form of these ritual procedures and saw him at home. The actual trial 
before the Army court was an official court process (the second form 
mentioned above) which Tsewang described in only brief detail in this 
case. All of the territories throughout the plateau had officials or 
headmen who knew how to carry out these procedures and could 
communicate with the central government in proper legal style. These 
ritualized procedures and documentary practices were the basic unifying 
element of the Tibetan legal system. They were the core of the system 
108 JIABS 18.1 
and yet, they were not contained in the law codes and were never 
written down as rules. 
And what were the roles in the secular legal system and to whom 
were they available? And what did legal representatives have to know 
to be skilled at their jobs? The courtroom personnel for an official trial 
like this consisted of at least two (usually three or more) judges on 
raised mattresses in front of low tables, several clerks, usually seated 
against a side wall, a caretaker to announce the case, and often, several 
helpers to bring the parties in, find evidence and carry messages. Most 
offices in Tibet were staffed by at least one monk official and one lay 
official; in courts, these two officials were the judges. The lay official 
positions were filled by sons of nobles, sons of clerks of the larger 
families and sons of private land owners who encouraged their children 
to get an education. Monk official positions were filled with sons 
from the elite noble class and non-elite trainees of all social levels who 
had entered the monastery early and had proven to be particularly 
smart and skilled. The role of the conciliator was available to any 
individual with religious devotion, good administration skills or 
wealth. Other less formal rituals—rolling dice, visiting an oracle and 
swearing before a diety—were arranged by a variety of specialized 
practitioners. 
Tsewang Tamdin outlined some of the necessary characteristics and 
knowledge for a legal representative, an official or a conciliator: ability 
in speaking, skill at drafting and writing both petitions and decisions, 
ability in calculating court costs and other payments, knowledge of the 
appropriateness of various forums and customary types of sanctions, 
ability in creating a legal file, knowledge of the law codes and famil-
iarity with the standard procedure for all official and non-official legal 
processes. 
Language played a vital role in the structuring, processing and win-
ning of law suits in Tibet. Forensic skill was thought by Tibetans to 
be intimately related to Tibetan Buddhist monastic debate and particu-
larly Buddhist reasoning styles. Many of the important legal represen -
tatives in Lhasa were either monks or individuals with some religious 
training. Because he was not monastically trained, Twewang Tamdin 
emphasized another important legal repertoire—knowledge of the law 
codes and the use of ancient proverbs and phrases from the law codes. 
These phrases conveyed in clever encapsulated packets the essence of a 
legal position. 
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Why was the murderer signing a final judicial document and proffer-
ring money in court? The concept of consent was also applied in 
Tibet to the actual decision made in a case. Tsewang Tamdin stated 
that as the representative of the community of the victims, he, the 
murderer and the other parties had to first listen to and then read the 
complete statement of the facts and the decision of the court. At that 
point, they were expected to state any objections to the decision which 
they might have. Then, given their consent and consensus, the parties, 
even parties to a murder trial, were expected to sign the document to 
indicate their agreement to the final decision. 
Our narrator saw this process as natural and not requiring an explana-
tion, so I will offer a few possible reasons for this practice: first, it 
insured the penetration of the individual mental conscience of a party, 
which was the true center of all decision-making and social control in 
Tibet. Second, for a society with very little sanctioning power, it 
provided some contractual (rather than penal) assurance that the deci-
sion would be followed. Third, it impressed upon the criminal the 
nature of her or his crime and the punishments which she or he would 
have to accept. The "initial whip" given by the guards when the defen-
dant arrived at the beginning of the story was thought by Tibetans to 
be a punishment which impressed upon the criminal the severity of his 
or her acts and insured the mindfulness necesary to prevent repetition. 
The Grammar of the Law. 
What does this story tell us about the Tibetan law codes? During other 
interviews, Tsewang Tamdin read and discussed sections of the 
Tibetan law codes with me as did other officials. However, most of 
my information for this response comes from collecting, compiling, 
translating and annotating these texts myself with a former Tibetan 
monk official, Kungo Thubten Sangye. 
Given the texts currently available to us, there appear to be four 
periods of law code drafting in Tibet: 
1. the rules and proclamations of the kings during the empire period 
which have been translated and discussed in detail by the late Gesa 
Uray; 
2. the sne'ugdong law code composed in the first half of the fif-
teenth century; 
3. the gtsang code composed sometime between 1623 and 1642; and 
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4. the Dalai Lama or dga' Idan pho brang codes of 1650 and 1679.2 
These law codes are filled with proverbs and phrases, bits of Buddhist 
reasoning, codified social patterns, bartering equivalents and factoring 
techniques for assessing cases.Their language is sixteenth and seven-
teenth century bureaucratese, archaic, poetic in spots and precatory. 
Two other points about the law codes are important to mention at 
this juncture: they did not contain any legal rules in the strong, for-
mal, command-prescriptive sense that we use that term.3 It strikes me 
that it is quite possible that the Tibetan use of "weak rules," if I may 
call it that, will be revelatory of how rules, particularly legal rules, 
work in general. A second point is that their law codes do not contain 
any detailed rendering of the four types of ritual legal procedure out-
lined above, arguably the most important aspect of Tibetan law. This 
is an astonishing finding considering our western notions of the cen -
trality and power of legal procedures and law codes. Legal procedure in 
Tibet was practiced, not written down and could only be collected 
through individual stories and case studies. 
One final question: how is it that the two women from the monks' 
village, laypeople from an outerlying area without a formal education, 
not only knew about the stong victim compensation payments listed 
in the law codes but knew how much they should be, who should 
receive them and how one should go about petitioning for them during 
a trial. The stong system, one of the most distinguishing features of 
the Tibetan law codes, was a nine-part ranking system, by social and 
economic status, of all of the individuals in Tibetan society from the 
Dalai Lama who ranked above the highest of the high to 
hermaphrodites and beggers who ranked below the lowest of the low. 
Once the amount of the stong was determined from the victim's social 
level, it became the central figure from which other payments could be 
calculated, such as the degree of physical injury from a wound. The 
Case of the Murdered Monks demonstrates both the layperson's 
knowledge of the stong ranking and its actual operation and yet we are 
left with the question, how is it that the average illiterate layperson 
had such a detailed knowledge of information contained in the law 
2. I have given a full description of these codes in an article entitled, "Tibet-
an Legal Literature: the Law Codes of the dga' Idan pho brang" in a forth-
coming volume entitled Tibetan Literature from Snow lion Press, Ithaca. 
3. It might be more accurate to say that Tibetans did not understand rules in 
this strong sense. 
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codes? Tsewang Tamdin's answer was that much of the law codes were 
generally known because they were compilations of Tibetan customs. 
This concludes the exegesis of the Cosmology of Law of this case. 
A third goal of this paper was to question the ways in which we con-
struct our categories of meaning in legal inquiries. I would like to 
shift to a brief consideration of some of the concepts which I have 
been using to question the epistemological and other assumptions 
upon which these constructed categories of meaning are based. 
Talal Asad in his latest book, Genealogies of Religion, posits that 
terms such as "religion," "ritual," and "secular" as they are currently 
employed in the literature have become culture-specific, modern con-
structs. The liberal humanist principles of the Enlightenment changed 
the meaning of these constructs by positing a mobile, creative human 
actor who could actively engage in building a modern secular nation 
state. Thus, the modern understanding of these terms compresses and 
encodes several (foundational) assumptions such as the idea of self-
constitution and self-choice, the strict division between the religous 
and secular spheres, autonomy, personal consciousness, agency, teleo-
logical narratives, progressive time and modern historicity. Given 
these encoded assumptions, the contemporary Christian understanding 
of religious ritual is ritual as a symbolic repetitive act by an 
autonomous actor. The pre-modern Christian religious ritual, Asad 
argues, was based on a different ontology and epistemology. Religious 
ritual was understood as a prescribed set of practices or performances 
which depended on individual discipline and ability to guide the ini-
tiate to the virtuous moral self. Asad's insights are clearly relevant to 
Buddhist religious ritual. Hence, Buddhist religion in premodern 
times such as the period of the Case of the Murdered Monks must be 
analyzed without the modern assumptions of protean transformation of 
self, the fractured world, decentered communities and the creative, 
individuated, autonomous actor. 
A similar concern can be expressed about the modern use of the 
word "law," which covers a wide panoply of characteristics from gen-
eralized social control mechanisms in society, justice, forms of reason -
ing, fairness and rules to bureacratic institutions, professional deci-
sion-makers, courts and sanctions. Modern models of legal systems 
such as Luhmann and Tuebner's autopoietic theory which depicts law 
as a detached system of authoritative regulation with an "essentially 
self-referential system of communication that is cognitively open and 
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normatively closed," are part of our own modern mythic constructs 
about the nature of institutions in complex societies. While these 
models may be of some value to sociologists and scholars of modern 
legal systems, they provide very little guidance as to the nature of 
legal practice in pre-modern Buddhist countries. 
How then should we go about unpacking what we mean when we 
ask questions about the movement of "Buddhist law" across South 
Asia or the reception or development of "secular law" within a Bud -
dhist country like Tibet? How can we avoid using terms that are 
already loaded with modern meaning? One approach is to begin with 
cases, circumstances which are temporally and socially contextualized. 
For example, in response to the question about "secular law" in Bud-
dhist Tibet, it is possible to say that in the 1930s and 1940s among 
individuals such as Tsewang Tamdin, the legal system was not sepa-
rate or in any way in opposition to the worldview of the Buddha 
except perhaps to the extent that a judge appeared to violate a Bud-
dhist value. Instead there was the realm of society, wholly interpene-
trated by and with the religion of the Buddha, and within that realm 
were a set of social institutions and practices demarcated as rgyal 
khrims, state laws. This area was in consonance with the Buddhist 
canon in that it was viewed as being based entirely on the Vinaya and 
included Buddhist means of factoring and Buddhist forms of reason -
ing. But the state laws were definitely not "Buddhist law" in that they 
were not for monks, but for lay people; they had a different historical 
development and basis in the ancient kings and they were rooted in a 
document that was not considered part of the Tibetan religious canon. 
So, in the captital city of Lhasa, there was no real secular legal sphere, 
as the terms "secular" and "legal" are understood in modern, western 
societies. 
We have come then, full circle, back to the cement room in 
Dharamsala, India with its pastel painted walls and low table with two 
cups of Tibetan tea. Tsewang Tamdin's story and explanations are the 
key to the construction of a commensurate picture of the legal frame-
work of Tibetan Buddhist society in the 1940s. Through the lens of 
one legal case, we are presented with a picture of the institutions, the 
legal concepts and the practices through which they are employed and 
interrelated. 
FRENCH 113 
Many different legal stories and cases can then be combined into a 
Tibetan Cosmology of Law. It is important to set out some of the 
key premises for such an investigation: 
First, this approach locates both Buddhism and law in a specific 
local culture, deeply influenced by that particular context, its time and 
place, its history, ecology, economy, and power relations. With rich 
contextualization may come the knowledge of strong differences which 
may make comparative enterprises initially difficult but ultimately 
more enriching. 
Second, both Buddhism and law are understood as social practices 
constituted by the actions of individuals. While this step appears to 
radically reorient our perspective from the meta-historical and state 
level to an actor-oriented, bottom-up perspective, many of the actors 
operated within the fields of legal institutions of the state. Charles 
Taylor has called the social practices derived from the intersubjective 
meanings of actors "essentially modes of social relations, of mutual 
action."4 This is what we are looking for here. 
Third, composite contextual pictures are constructed from cases, nar-
ratives, life histories, commentaries, perhaps even observations of cur-
rent populations. Similarly, the presentation of the material from 
multiple perspectives and in multiple forms—as in the form of case 
histories, stones and summations—provides a deeply-layered, rich, 
legal cosmological picture. 
Fourth, most of the concepts within the field of law must be under-
stood as capable of multiple, even contradictory and ambiguous, inter-
pretations. To describe a particular concept therefore is to describe its 
range of possible interpretations and uses including its ambiquities, 
movements, and contradictions. Actors negotiate their own meanings 
from these concepts which they then employ within the legal process. 
It is the web of concepts as utilized in social practices which produces 
a legal field and thus caution must be taken in a comparative effort 
against extracting concepts which appear similar but are actually differ-
entially embedded in their legal fields. 
Fifth, the ritual of law is a meaningful social practice that has at 
least three aspects: the transformation of circumstances into the legal 
field, the ritual, and the reallocation of prestige, power, knowledge, 
4. From Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," The 
Review of Metaphysics 25 .1. 
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conceptual boundaries and perhaps even meaning as a result. Legal 
social practices are thus transformative and protean in nature. 
Sixth, although the elements of a legal cosmology may vary from 
culture to culture and from time to time, there are six major elements 
to the construction of such a picture of social practices in Lhasa, Tibet 
in the 1940's which will, perhaps, give us some guidance. They are as 
follows: 
First, the Nature of Reality, Illusion, the Cosmos and Time: Tsewang 
Tamdin explained for us in his opening discussion that the Tibetan 
Buddhist notions of reality and illusion shifts and the threefold nature 
of reality, the everpresentness of realms, karma and atemporality, all 
influenced the way in which he prepared for this Case of the Murdered 
Monks. Here it is interesting to see which particular aspects of Bud-
dhist theory are incorporated into the legal cosmology, which are 
avoided and why. 
Second, the Mandala of the Law: The root metaphor for the Tibetan 
cosmos, the mandala, stood as a central symbolic structure for the 
entire legal system. Emblematic of both the secular outside and the 
sacred Buddhist core and non-dualistic oneness, it was understood to 
map directly on the levels of legal administration from the periphery 
to the core culminating in the central administration. Tsewang 
Tamdin guided us through these layered institutions, roles and offices 
and demonstrated many of their key aspects such as their lack of 
exclusive jurisdiction, open forums, consensus required to start a suit, 
etc. 
Third, Moral Narrative and Myths: It mattered enormously in court 
that the monks were khams pa, likely to explode into a quarrel at any 
moment and that the alleged murderer was from the newly formed, 
pacifist army. The factoring of the aspects of the murder, Tsewang told 
us, came from the Buddhist factors related to the Ten Non-Virtuous 
Actions and the Buddha stood throughout as a constant referential 
backdrop, in the form of a series of lifetales, for the right ways of 
action. 
Fourht, the Jurisprudence of the Mind: While presenting the case in 
court for the two women, Tsewang Tamdin worked within a wide 
range of concepts, some from Buddhism and some not, which directed 
his arguments. He told us that the core of each individual was the 
innate ability to be enlightened and mental conscience was the center 
of the legal system. The mind was the entity capable of reaching con-
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sensus, producing conflict, showing rang khrims or moral self-regula-
tion. Other aspects of jurisprudence included notions of causation, 
proof, power over and appropriateness. 
Fifth, the Rituals, Language and Roles: Our narrator also told us 
about the close relationship between monastic debate and legal debate 
and his mastery of another important linquisitic repertoire, the law 
codes and the ancient proverbs and phrases. We find out from him that 
the four legal procedure rituals of Tibet, the heart of legal administra-
tion of the country, is acquired through oral knowledge and not in the 
law codes. And finally, 
Sixth, the Grammar of the Law: When we come to a consideration of 
the law codes and their structure, we find no strong rules, so important 
to the entire understanding of law in the West. Without precedent, did 
rule-like thinking even exist in the Tibetan legal system? We know 
that they had elaborate ritualized procedures to follow, a strict docu-
mentary practice and calculation of court costs according to the stong. 
Perhaps there was little need for rulemaking with a system of 
"radically particularized" individuals, codified customary practice, and 
Buddhist style factoring without western notions of equality. 
The Tibetan Cosmology of Law has been presented in this paper 
through the Case of the Murdered Monks, who met their demise at the 
hand of a member of the Tibetan Army in the 1940s. The case has 
been used as device to explicate some aspects of the Tibetan Buddhist 
legal system under the Dalai Lamas. We have also learned a bit about 
what an interpretive, actor-centered, insider perspective of the Tibetan 
legal system will provide us with, how it contrasts with the picture 
provided in the law codes of this period and how it might help us to 
avoid some of the traps of modern terminology. 
Legal cosmology also constitutes a basis for making comparisons 
with other Buddhist societies. The legal cosmology of law in pre-
modern Tibet might first be compared to constructed cosmologies of 
law in other pre-modern Buddhist societies, then to other legal sys-
tems. Contrasting richly contextualized pictures, an exercise in com-
parative positionality, if you will, allows for a thicker representation 
of the material that we wish to compare. It also presents a possible 
compromise for the deconstructionist project which tends to relativize 
and delegitimize these larger, comparative questions. We are, then, at 
one and the same time, firmly seated on a mattress, drinking tea with 
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Tsewang Tamdin and stretching across continents to sit at tables and 
inside courts in other lands of the Buddha. 
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